ABSTRACT. Elimination of quantifiers is shown to fail dramatically for a group of well-known mathematical theories (classically enjoying the property) against a wide range of relevant logical backgrounds. Furthermore, it is suggested that only by moving to more extensional underlying logics can we get the property back.
INTRODUCTION
The property of quantifier elimination for a theory has the following classical uses ( [10] , pp. 68-69): (1) classification of structures up to elementary equivalence, (2) completeness and decidability proofs for theories, (3) description of elementary embeddings, and (4) description of definable relations in a structure. In this paper, we chose to focus on the latter and, as in [12] , take it to be the fundamental import of quantifier elimination. Our aim is to explore elimination of quantifiers in the non-classical setting of quantificational logics which are sound with respect to the Routley-Meyer semantic framework from relevant logic [23] . 1 Such quantificational logics include many relevant and paraconsistent logics as well as, say, classical logic.
We should alert the reader that the concern of the present pages will be with mathematical theories (theories describing some mathematical structure), so we will disregard things such as the pure theory of equality given that we will assume equality to be a logical notion with a fixed interpretation. 2 Some examples of mathematical theories are the theory of dense linear orderings without endpoints, the theory of real closed fields, the theory of ordered divisible abelian groups and Presburger arithmetic. All these theories are known to have quantifier elimination in the classical setting [12] . Here we investigate the fate of this property in the Routley-Meyer semantic framework.
We also look at the minimal logical principles that can be added to our formal systems to recover quantifier elimination. This is in line with some recent investigations into the non-classical models of mathematical theories. 3 Our toy theory will be the theory of dense linear orderings without endpoints (henceforth, DLO), which is the simplest around. 4 This paper is (fundamentally) a contribution to the study of paraconsistent mathematical theories (i.e., theories where from a sentence and its negation not everything follows). Our work is motivated by the need of understanding just how different the behaviour of these theories is from that of their classical counterparts. We would like to stress that, surprisingly, most of the research done in this field with logics having a detachable conditional has used algebraic models. In that sense, [22] seems to be the first (and likely only) place where Routley-Meyer relational models have been employed in the study of substructural mathematical theories as we will do below.
In §2, we review the details of the Routley-Meyer semantics as well as introduce the fundamental definitions we will be working with. In §3, we present the theories we will be studying. In §4, we show that quantifier elimination fails for well-known mathematical theories when the underlying logic is any of the most famous systems of relevant logic. In §5, we discuss how to get quantifier elimination back. Finally, in §6, we summarize our results.
LOGICAL PRELIMINARIES
All the languages we will be considering will have connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, → , ∀, ∃, ⊥, ⊤ (with the usual arities) and a denumerable list of individual variables x 0 , x 1 , . . . . As usual, by the signature of a language we will mean its relation, function and constant symbols.
We will be presenting relevant logics semantically rather than syntactically. The reason for this is that Fine [8] has shown that the natural proof-theoretic formulation of the well-know system R of relevant logic plus first order quantifiers is incomplete with respect to the Routley-Meyer semantic framework. 5 Hence, if one desires to find a complete axiomatization for the systems we will call B, R and RM they would need to go beyond what is usually understand proof-theoretically by these calculi. It is not difficult to show, however, that our semantically defined systems are indeed recursively axiomatizable using Craig's method.
Models.
We employ the standard ternary relation semantics, also routinely called the "Routley-Meyer" semantics. A B-model is a structure M = W, R, D, * , s, V where W is a non-empty set (of worlds), R ⊆ W 3 , D is a set of objects (the domain),
V is a valuation such that if w ∈ W and P n is an n-ary predicate, V(w, P n ) ⊆ D n , and moreover:
• For any α ∈ W, Rsαα • for any α, β, γ, δ ∈ W, Rsαβ and Rβγδ implies that Rαγδ
. The special predicate = will always be interpreted as the metatheoretic classical identity unless stated otherwise.
The additional ternary relation restrictions necessary for the logic R-mingle, or RM, are as follows (the axioms enforced by the principles are included): 
Given a model M, we will use a to denote a sequence of individuals of the domain of M. Truth of complex formulae at a world is defined as follows: 6 Sans-serif uppercase letters give the Combinatory names of implication axioms, and are used throughout, in line with standard usage in the relevant literature. A good introduction to Combinatory logic can be found in [2] , and details regarding the correspondence between combinators and implicational formulae can be found in [1] [ §71] or in [5] . Quantifier elimination is a model-theoretic property in the sense that it considerably simplifies the theory of the definable sets of the models of a given theory: these amount to the things one can define using quantifier free formulas.
SOME MATHEMATICAL THEORIES
In this section, we will review the axiomatizations of a our target mathematical theories. The theories as presented are, of course, not the classical theories which go by these names, as the underlying logic differs from classical logic. However, we retain (roughly) the same axioms as the classical theories, though stated in nonclassical vocabulary. We shall be focused on properties had by classical formal theories which are lost when the underlying logic is relevant, and so we shall use the usual names for the classical theories to make explicit the comparison.
Dense Linear Orderings. In a signature with a binary relation symbol <, DLO without endpoints is given by the following axioms:
If DLO is formulated with ∀x¬(x < x) instead of A1 it is a simple matter to build a one element model for it, so the following result (though easy) is a necessary preliminary. Proof. This is easily seen essentially as in the classical case by constructing an infinitely ascending (descending) sequence (in the ordering holding at world s) of distinct elements of the domain of objects of any B-model of DLO. In the reasoning one needs to use the property Rsss of B-models in an essential way but only axioms A1, A5 (or alternatively A6) and A3.
We have to insist that the failure of QE for DLO (which will be established below in §4) holds, a fortiori, for DLO with ∀x¬(x < x) replacing A1. We do not have a direct proof of the failure of QE for such alternative formulation of DLO. A similar remark applies to all the theories we will examine in this paper, hence whenever ¬A occurs in a standard classical axiomatisation of some theory, we shall replace 7 DLO with a paraconsistent underlying logic has been studied in [7] as formulated in the →-free fragment of our language (where A → B is replaced by ¬A ∨ B).
this with A → ⊥. For the QE result when the underlying logic is strengthened, DLO in its current form looks like what is required.
Real Closed Fields. The signature of the real closed fields has a binary predicate symbol <, binary function symbols +, ×, unary function symbols −, −1 , and constants 0, 1. The theory RCF has the following axioms:
Presburger arithmetic. The signature of Presburger arithmetic has a binary predicate symbol <, unary predicates P n (n > 1), a binary function symbol +, and constants 0, 1. The axioms are as follows:
Divisible Ordered Abelian Groups. The signature of the theory of divisible ordered abelian groups (DOAG) has a binary predicate symbol <, a unary function symbol −, a binary function symbol +, and the constants 0. Here is the list of axioms:
Algebraically Closed Fields. The signature of the algebraically closed fields has binary function symbols +, ×, unary function symbols −, −1 , and constants 0, 1. The theory ACF has the following axioms:
FAILURE OF QUANTIFIER ELIMINATION
In this section we study the failure of QE for most of the theories from §3. Note that we employ the following seriality condition: ∀x∃y, z(Rxyz). This is need for the proof, but is not motivated by any considerations other than that it is so needed. We have not discovered a means of obtaining this important result without the seriality condition.
LEMMA 4. Let L be any logic extending B such that its frames satisfy the condition ∀x∃y, z(Rxyz) (a seriality requirement). Then if A(x) is a quantifier free formula with one free variable in DLO without endpoints, either A(x)
↔ x = x or A(x) ↔ x < x.
Proof. We proceed by structural induction on A(x):
Induction step: We proceed by cases on the main connective of A(x), where the induction hypothesis guarantees that any component formula
. By induction hypothesis, we know that any of the following four may be true of B(x), C(x).
So, we have four possibilities to consider:
(1) (i) and (iii) (2) (i) and (iv) (3) (ii) and (iii) (4) (ii) and (iv) Suppose (i) and (iii) hold.
The result for (ii) and (iv) is similar.
Suppose (i) and (iv) hold.
the right to left implication follows using A1). The result for (ii) and (iii) is similar.
. By inductive hypothesis we have the same set of possibilities as above.
Suppose that (i), (iii) hold. As in Case 1,
we need merely note that by A1 and the transitivity of →,
, and we have as an instance of an axiom of
It is easy to check that ¬x = x → ⊥ is a theorem (recall that the interpretation of = has been fixed at every world) and ⊥ → x < x, hence A(x) ↔ x < x using A1. Suppose that B(x) ↔ x < x. Then A(x) ↔ ¬x < x. By A1, contraposition, the fixed interpretation of = which makes x = x ↔ ⊤ hold, and transitivity of →, it follows that Suppose
Note that using the seriality condition on our frames, (⊤ → ⊥) ↔ ⊥ must hold. It suffices to note that never ⊤ → ⊥ holds at any world α of any model, for otherwise, using seriality, ⊥ would have to hold at some world, which is impossible. Hence, (x = x → x < x) ↔ ⊥, and the definition of ⊥ gives us that ⊥ ↔ [2, 3] and assigns false to any atomic formula involving rationals outside this interval. At every world, = is interpreted as real identity.
• s is the designated world.
• * = { s, t , t, s } The reader can easily convince themselves that DLO is validated at s. On the other hand, it is a tedious, but mechanical process to check that N satisfies the frame conditions to validate the logic RM. 9 The definition of {2} at world s is the formula
This is due to the fact that for any a,
First, it is easy to see that N, s ¬∃x( [2] since N, t ∃x(x < y) [2] by definition of N and N, s ∀x(x = x) → ∃x(y < x) [2] given that N, w ∃x(y < x) [2] for any w ∈ W. Finally, note that by definition of N, 2 is the only element a ∈ D for which N, t ∃x(x < y) [a] and N, t ∃x(y < x) [a] .
These results show that ¬∃x(x < y) ∧ (∀x(x = x) → ∃x(y < x)) is not equivalent to ⊤ or ⊥, (that is, is not equivalent to x < x or x = x). Now, given that the models for RM satisfy the seriality condition, by Lemma 4, ¬∃x(x < y) ∧ (∀x(x = x) → ∃x(y < x)) is not equivalent to a quantifier free formula. •
• s is the designated world • V assigns the usual <-ordering on Q.
• V assigns = real identity. • W = {s, t} 9 It has been verified using PROVER9, a computer proof assistant McCune [13] 10 The formula ∀y, z(¬(x < y < z) ∨ x < y < z) is another example of something that has no quantifierless equivalent in DLO. So, in fact, → is not essential to construct such a formula.
•
• s is the designated world • V assigns the usual <-ordering on Q at s, and assigns < to ∅ at t.
• V assigns = real identity at every world. Given the definition of V for < at s, N DLO. Again, N is countable. We need only note that N, s ∀x(x = •
• s is the designated world • V assigns the usual <-ordering on Q On this model, the 'classical' model for RM, we have that M, s ¬(∀x¬x < x → ∀x∃yy < x). In the model N defined in Theorem 3, we have that N, t ∀x¬x < x → ∀x∃yy < x because N, t ∀x¬x < x and N, t ∀x∃yy < x. Hence, it is the case that DLO ∀x¬x < x → ∀x∃yy < x and DLO ¬(∀x¬x < x → ∀x∃yy < x).
So, for DLO, we have the failure of negation completeness, quantifier elimination, ω-categoricity, and it's fairly obvious that we also have the failure of modelcompleteness. Essentially, in any relevant logic, DLO fails to have any of the nice model-theoretic properties it enjoys in the classical context. At base, one can chalk this up to the fact that in the relevant setting, we have much more power to construct countermodels. Proof. Consider the first order structure R, < R , + R , − R , −1 R , × R , 0 R , 1 R . By the upward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, there is an elementary (in the sense of classical first order logic) extension
R ′ is a model of the classical theory of real closed fields. Furthermore, it can be guaranteed that |R| < |{x ∈ R ′ : 0 R ′ < R ′ x}|.
Define the ordering < ′ on R ′ as:
where the expression y − x abbreviates y + (−x) as usual. First, we see that for x ∈ R ′ , it cannot be the case that x < ′ x since 0 < R ′ x − x = 0 is false. So < ′ is irreflexive. If x, y, z ∈ R ′ , x < ′ y and y < ′ z, i. e., 0 < R ′ y − x ∈ R and 0 < R ′ z − y ∈ R, then 0 < R ′ z − x = (y − x) + (z − y) ∈ R (for R is certainly closed under +), which means that x < ′ z. So < ′ is transitive. Now if 0 < ′ x and 0 < ′ y, i.e., 0 < R ′ x − 0 = x ∈ R and 0 < R ′ y − 0 = y ∈ R then surely 0 < R ′ xy − 0 = xy ∈ R (for R is also closed under ×), i.e., 0 < ′ xy. Finally, if x < ′ y, i. e., 0 < R ′ y − x ∈ R then since z − z = 0, it follows that 0 < R ′ (y + z) − (x + z) = (y − x) + (z − z) ∈ R, which means that x + z < ′ y + z.
Now consider a Routley-Meyer model
• All constants and function symbols of the language of RCF are interpreted on s, s , s, t, t , t, s, s , t, s, t , t, t, s , t, t, t , s, t , s } • V assigns the symbol < the (strict) ordering < R ′ on R ′ at world s. At world t, V assigns the ordering < ′ as the interpretation of the symbol <. Note that since < ′ ⊂< R ′ , V is an admissible valuation in the Routley-Meyer semantics. At every world, = is interpreted as real identity.
• * = { s, t , t, s }. This structure is a model of RCF. Next take any r ∈ {x ∈ R ′ : 0 R ′ < R ′ x} \ R (recall that we made sure that such an r exists). Now, (r
Observe that in this model ¬∀x(x = x)) is essentially just ⊥. Now take the model N ′′ of RCF which is just N ′ but with D = R. With this modification, the ordering < ′ basically collapses to < R . It is easy to see then that
Finally, one can show by induction on formula complexity that if A(x) is a quantifier free relevant formula in the full language of RCF and a a sequence of objects from the domain R of N ′′ , w ∈ W, then
But with the above results this implies that the formula in the free variable x,
cannot be equivalent to any quantifierless formula of the language of RCF 11 , so the theory lacks QE.
THEOREM 9. Let L be any relevant logic between B and RM. Then QE fails for Presburger arithmetic in L.
Proof. This follows as for RCF except that we work with Z rather than R, and a smaller signature. The reader can fill in the details.
THEOREM 10. Let L be any relevant logic between B and RM. Then QE fails for DOAG in L.
Proof. The proof is left to the reader and it follows as for the case of RCF again, by using Q rather than R.
To end this section we wish to remark that the failure of QE presented here cannot be fixed by taking a weaker notion of QE where we merely demand interdeducibility with a quantifier free formula as opposed to equivalence in the sense of a relevant biconditional. The reason is that our arguments show that the formulas witnessing the failure of QE cannot be interdeducible with any quantifierless formula either. To see this note that, for instance, in the proof of Theorem 8, we actually showed that there cannot be any quantifierless formula A(x) such that:
, which means that no such quantifierless formula can be interdeducible with ∀y, z((x < y < z ∧ ¬(y < z)) → ¬∀x(x = x)).
THEORIES WITH QUANTIFIER ELIMINATION
In this section we study under which circumstances can we get QE back. Some proofs are simply arguments from [12] , given in the Routley-Meyer semantic framework.
PROPOSITION 11. Let L be any logic extending B + K such that its frames satisfy the condition ∀x∃y, z(Rxyz), M = W, R, D, * , s, V an L-model for DLO, A(x) a formula of DLO, and a a sequence of elements of D. Then for any w ∈ W, M, w A[a] iff M, s A[a].
Proof. The frame condition for K (the principle A → (B → A)) is:
Rαβγ only if Rsαγ.
Now we proceed by induction of the complexity of A(x). Suppose first that A(x) is an atomic formula of the form x i < y j . Then if M, s A[a], M, w A[a]
follows by the Hereditary condition and the fact that Rssw in the presence of (1) L-models for DLO, and a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ D, b 1 , . . . , b n ∈ D ′ sequences such that a 1 < · · · < a n and b 1 Proof. The function f is built by a back-and-forth argument. 12 We make sure by
. . be enumerations of D \ {a 1 , . . . , a n } and D ′ \ {b 1 , . . . , b n } respectively. Next we build a sequence 
n (this comes essentially from the same argument showing that DLO has no models with a finite domain). A similar thing is the case when (2) holds. In case (3), given that N, 
The cardinality of both D and D ′ has to be infinite. Since the language of quantificational relevant logic can be embedded in a satisfaction preserving way into the language of classical first order logic, by the classical downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, M and N can both be assumed to be countable. By Proposition 12, they have to make exactly the same sentences hold at s and s ′ , which contradicts our assumption. ¬A. Since, according to Proposition 13, all L-models of DLO make exactly the same sentences true, it must be the case that either every L-model for DLO make A the case or that every L-model for DLO make ¬A hold. Hence, either DLO A or DLO ¬A. Suppose now that A(x) is a formula in the free variables x 1 , . . . , x n . Let h : { i, j : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n} −→ {0, 1, 2} and consider the formula B h (x 1 , . . . , x n ) defined as follows:
Write Λ A for the set of all B h (x 1 , . . . , x n ) with h : { i, j : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n} −→ {0, 1, 2} such that there is a sequence of elements a of D for which An example of a logic in which DLO will have all the nice features described above is B + C +K (since all frames for this logic satisfy ∀x(Rxsx)). Proof. Using the downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem and the fact that Routley-Meyer models are first order structures, it is not difficult to see that it suffices to establish the theorem for models with a countable domain of objects. By examining the proof of the previous theorem, it is easy to see how it can be adapted mutatis mutandis up to the case that Λ A = ∅. At this point what is required is an instance of Cantor's theorem saying that where M = W, R, D, * , s, V is a countable L-model for DLO, and a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ D, b 1 , . . . , b n ∈ D sequences such that a 1 < · · · < a n and b 1 < · · · < b n hold at s, then there is a bijective mapping f : D −→ D such that f (a i ) = b i and for any formula A(x) of DLO, w ∈ W and sequence of elements a of D,
A simple modification of the proof of Cantor's theorem suffices to establish it. The construction of f is basically as before. To prove the above equivalence we need to note first that for any sequence of objects a, M, w
if A is atomic. This follows by the same argument used for the basis of the inductive proof of Proposition 11. Now a simple induction on formula complexity takes care of the rest.
So if the interest in QE was to reduce the complexity of the definable sets of any given model of DLO, B + K is a logic extending B which has this effect, and we see no way to regain this result without employing K, or some similar principle which has the effect of eliminating all the worlds in the Routley-Meyer model except the designated world. It is important to note that this theorem implies that one cannot use the same strategy we used to refute QE for DLO in B in order to refute QE for DLO in B + K. For there is no model M for DLO in B + K and formula A(x) such that A(x) does not define a set already definable by a quantifierless formula at s in M. . This follows by an easy induction on formula complexity as before. So, in these models, a formula of the form A → B comes down semantically to the same as a formula of the form ¬A ∨ B, which means that all relevant formulas in these models are equivalent to →-free formulas. Since ACF based on classical logic has QE, it suffices to show that every theorem of classical ACF is also a theorem of ACF in L. But the contrapositive of this is easily established, for if M = W, R, D, * , s, V is an L-model for ACF and M, s A for some relevant formula A (which without loss of generality can be taken to be →-free), then a classical model refuting A is easily extracted by interpreting function symbols in D as they are interpreted at world s in the Routley-Meyer model. 13 The above proof works, in fact, for any theory whose classical counterpart has QE and that does not contain non-logical symbols other than function and constants.
This positive result (as the one for DLO) is, of course, sensitive to a change of our background assumptions on equality. In this paper we have taken the predicate to mean real identity under all circumstances. This position is certainly rejected by most relevant logicians, though. This is because it produces validities like A → ∀x(x = x) for any arbitrary A. Relevant logicians would normally require just something like principles (R), (T) and (L) in the theorem below to hold. In such case, QE can be shown to fail by arguments similar to the ones in §4. This indicates that there is very little hope for positive results on QE when = is allowed all the freedom most relevant logicians would grant it. In other words, for the dedicated relevant logician, QE fails for quite simple reasons in most circumstances. 14 THEOREM 18. Suppose that all we require semantically from the predicate = is that it satisfies the principles of reflexivity, transitivity, and a version of Leibniz's law
Let L be any logic between B and RM. Then QE fails for ACF in L.
Proof. We argue in a rather similar way as in the failure of QE for RCF. However, this time we use the classical structure A, + A , − A , −1 A , × A , 0 A , 1 A of algebraic numbers and some uncountable elementary extension (again in the classical sense)
This kind of argument would have also established QE for DLO for logics extending B + K and with frames satisfying seriality. However, our previous argument for DLO was much more informative. 14 Note, our results do not directly rule out building theories with QE by means of Skolemization, so we cannot make this claim quite unequivocally.
• All constants and function symbols of the language of ACF are interpreted on A ′ as in A ′ , + A ′ , − A ′ , −1 ′ A , × A ′ , 0 A ′ , 1 A ′ .
• R = { s, s, s , s, t, t , t, s, s , t, s, t , t, t, s , t, t, t , s, t, s } • V assigns to the symbol = real equality on A ′ at world s. At world t, V assigns equality restricted to A as the interpretation of the symbol =.
Note that since V(=, t) ⊂ V(=, s), V is a valuation in the Routley-Meyer semantics.
• * = { s, t , t, s }. This structure is a model of ACF. Next take any r ∈ A ′ \ A (recall that we made sure that such an r exists since A ′ is uncountable while A is countable). Now, cannot be equivalent to any quantifierless formula of the language of ACF, so the theory does not have QE.
CONCLUSION
One of the main morals is that the property of quantifier elimination for a number of well-known mathematical theories (involving non-logical predicate -and not just function -symbols) is easily lost in many relevant logics. Naturally, this is because logics that bring the property back are nearly classical, in that they enforce strong extensional equivalences which are rejected in a relevant setting. So when working in a more fine-tuned context, with fewer principles available, a property like QE which marks a theory's simplicity should no longer be expected to hold. As anyone who has tried to do non-classical mathematics can testify, there is a substantial jump in complexity from classical to non-classical mathematics.
It is of definite importance to the study of relevant logic and mathematics that K plays a key role in capturing classical results for DLO. Thinning does play a key role, and if the relevance properties of the logic involve rejecting K, then logics which respect relevance provide a view of standard mathematical theories far different from the orthodoxy. This should not be particularly surprising in itself, but what is surprising is that in a logic as weak as B, the addition of just K and a plausible seriality condition on Routley-Meyer frames goes a long way to capturing classical results. That is, insofar as one may want QE and categoricity considerations are useful for purposes (1)- (4) in §1, at least K is required (and indeed, in addition to K nothing beyond B is required). The dedicated relevantist, classical logician, or non-partisan observer can, of course, take these results negatively, as showing that irrelevance really plays a core role in standard mathematical modeltheoretic reasoning. However, there is a more interesting response available, to which we have gestured. This is that even in the case of simple mathematical theories like those considered here, a logical approach maintaining relevance opens a view which, as Meyer and Mortensen claimed, "cannot impoverish insight into the nature of mathematical structures, but rather can only enrich it" [16] .
